IMPLEMENTING GOOD INTENTIONS: HOW RULES AND PROCEDURES MAY ALTER RESOURCE POLICY OUTCOMES by Libby, Lawrence W.
IMPLEMENTING  GOOD  INTENTIONS:
How  RULES  AND  PROCEDURES  MAY ALTER
RESOURCE  POLICY OUTCOMES
Lawrence  W. Libby
The Ohio State University
Introduction
U.S.  environmental  and natural  resource  policy has many  cases of misfired
good intentions, or less than good intentions that turned out better than they should
have.  Administrative rules and procedures ultimately determine what really happens
on  the  land  when new  policy  is  enacted.  The  purpose of those  procedures,  of
course,  is  to achieve  the results  embodied  in statements of legislative  intent that
were precursors to policy change.  That does not always happen.
All policy changes respond to changing views on how natural resources should
be used  and,  thereby, how  rights to determine  resource  use  should be distributed.
Demand for change may result from improved knowledge of natural systems or from
demographic  shifts that bring people  with different  preferences  into  contact with
existing resource  use patterns.  Most policy changes  are reactive, responding  to a
resource  problem  of some  kind,  rather  than anticipatory  or  seeking  long-term
management  for natural ecosystems.
Our overall policy system structures the opportunities  available to people with
access to markets, nudging  the millions of private  choices in directions deemed to
have  social utility.  Some  policies  do so  by  eliminating certain  options  from  the
opportunity sets of resource users, as with the U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA).  Others  accomplish  change  in  resource  use  through  elaborate  incentives
designed  to make  some  options more attractive  than others.  The Environmental
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) within the  1996 farm bill is an example of that
approach.  Performance of any new natural resource law or program depends on how
people respond to their options as defined by the rules that put the new law to work,
and  by bureaucrats  who  interpret those rules.  In  a real  sense, bureaucracy  is the
fourth branch of government; a critical, nontrivial component of our policy system.
In this paper, I review several examples of natural resource and environmental
policy that are instructive of the role of implementation in affecting the real outcomes
of those laws.  I also provide relevant subject details about the selected cases, and
offer  suggestions for policy educators.
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Perhaps the most striking example of  how implementing rules directly contradict
good intentions is the U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973.  This law prohibits the
taking of species  of flaura and fauna considered to be in danger of extinction.  Its
purpose  certainly  sounds  reasonable.
Taking as Habitat Modification.  The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) of the
U.S. Department of Interior, charged with responsibility to accomplish objectives of
species protection, has defined "taking" to include adversely modifying the habitat
that those  species  need  to  survive.  Harm to  a  listed species  is  defined  in FWS
guidelines to include "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering" (Welch, p.  166). A 1982 amendment permits private
landowners  to "incidentally take" members  of a protected  species so long as there
are plenty of that species elsewhere, and a "habitat conservation plan" is implemented
on the land in question.  While the objectives of ESA are laudable, rules to put these
good intentions into effect have caused problems, most of which should have been
predictable.
Prohibiting habitat modification that might harm a listed species can severely
reduce the  land use  options of a farmer  or forester.  This amounts to  state and/or
federal regulation of that land to achieve a recently defined public purpose.  Ownership
rights have never been absolute.  They are limited by actions that would harm the
safety, health or general welfare of others.  Those limits are always subject to change
as  new information becomes  available  or as  rights  of non-owners  are redefined.
Some  have  argued that  decisions  to  list certain  species  are driven  more  by  anti-
development or wildlife protection politics than objective evidence that a species is,
in fact, endangered.  High visibility "mega-fauna" like the gray wolf and bald eagle
are cases in point (Humphrey).  Property rights advocates argue that private options
are so limited by such restrictions that a "regulatory taking" of private property has
occurred (Welch).
Incentives  Contrary to Purpose.  Many landowners  feel that their natural
inclination to protect and husband the wildlife inhabiting their farm or woodland is
undercut by the draconian controls imposed to protect the habitat.  Finding evidence
of a listed species on his land may be a time of great excitement for the landowner, but
not of a positive form.  His immediate concern is how to deal with the bad news that
his harvesting  or land realignment plan may be unacceptable  habitat modification.
Too  often, the owner's response  is to remove evidence of those species before  the
Fish and Wildlife  Service is aware of its presence.  The owner feels punished rather
than privileged to have the species on his land.  That situation hardly bodes well for
the species  in question.  Just the  proposal that  a certain species  may be listed as
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their own scientific advocates  to argue against the listing (Goldstein).
A Case.  Among the many horror stories that compromise  good intentions is
the case of timber owner, Benjamin Cone, in North Carolina.  Nesting red-cockaded
woodpeckers  were  found on his land during preparation of a timber sale.  With the
required one-half mile radius around each bird colony protected from modification,
Mr. Cone lost the planned use of 1,560.8 acres of  his timberland, reducing its appraised
income potential from $2.3 million to $86,500  (Welch, p. 173-79).  His loss is society's
gain, of course, but it seems to many like a stiff price for one person to pay.  He may
sue under the  Fifth and  Fourteenth  Amendments  to the  U.S.  Constitution to seek
compensation for rights taken through confiscatory regulation.  Because he can still
earn some income by  harvesting pine  straw  and leasing hunting  rights, the  likely
result  of such a  costly  legal  step  is  unclear.  Such cases  breed  distrust  and  then
disrespect for what seems like a reasonable public purpose and the agency responsible
for implementing it.  Government agencies seeking the public interest simply cannot
succeed in an environment of rampant hostility, at least not for long.  In another well
known  case, FWS  staff in Florida were reluctant to define  needed  habitat for the
endangered  Florida panther for fear of landowner reaction.  Even in the late  1990s,
more than ten years after the species was listed, there  is no plan in place (Maehr).
Seeking  Better Incentives.  Alternative  incentive-based measures  are under
consideration to mobilize rather than frustrate a landowner's inherent appreciation of
resident wildlife. A "safe harbor" agreement with owners of red-cockaded woodpecker
habitat would permit the  owner to have assured future  development  in return for
immediate improvements to bird habitat elsewhere.  Various tax incentives (such as
deductibility of expenses for habitat protection) are on the table as well (Stone).  An
effort to lease  habitat modification  rights  from  Florida ranchers  in the interest  of
protecting at least a portion of the 925,000 acres of  prime habitat for panthers is under
consideration  (Evans).
Developing  "habitat conservation plans"  is the price  an owner must pay for
the incidental taking of protected species through adverse modification of necessary
habitat.  Again, the intent is honorable;  to fashion a compromise that corrects some
of the  harsh results  of outright  regulation.  The  question  is  how these  new rules
actually function  and whether they help achieve  the declared  intent of ESA.  The
Nature  Conservancy  learned that people  who  dealt with  FWS  in implementation
were  generally  not  convinced that  agency  staff were  up  to  the  task of granting
"incidental take permits"  and approving habitat conservation plans  in a consistent
and scientific  manner.  Landowners  were  afraid  that after  they  developed  costly
plans, FWS might not actually grant permits to modify habitat elsewhere  or might
come back to them with additional demands.  FWS staff made little effort to inform
landowners  about  how habitat  conservation  plans could work,  thus action on the
ground was  far below potential.  Since cost of establishing plans was borne almost
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There was too little information available on what practices would truly help protected
species, and how.  Owners resented the feeling that FWS held regulation over their
heads  as a threat but made  little  effort to establish  effective  habitat  conservation
plans (Humphrey).
Performance of New  Incentives.  There is little evidence that the combination
of incidental taking and habitat conservation planning will really contribute to recovery
of endangered species populations.  That is, of course, the fundamental purpose  of
ESA, but these implementing procedures seem targeted more at quelling controversy
than  facilitating  recovery.  The  "no  surprises"  language  that  is now part  of the
permitting process assures the landowner that once a plan is approved, no changes
will be required during the 20 to 100 years of the agreement.  That makes life easier for
the owner, and perhaps some protection is better than none, but the  stated purpose
of the law that started all of  this negotiation may be lost in the shuffle.  New information
could not be brought to the table if it might mean altering the agreement provisions.
This "no surprises" policy is becoming a standard part of new agreements, but it has
been  challenged  in the  courts as  being  arbitrary  and inconsistent  with the  stated
intent of the law (Shilling).
Large area multi-species plans are being  encouraged by FWS, but biologists
observe that actual habitat requirements of a selected few species in the mix typically
drive the whole plan.  Some endangered  species are being compromised to protect
the target species  in many  such plans.  FWS staff nationally are preoccupied  with
reviewing  habitat  conservation  plans with  little energy  left  over to consider new
species  listings or to  measure  the  performance  of rules  that  have  evolved  from
negotiations  between owners  and  governments.
Environmental Quality  Incentives  Program
This program is still in the early implementation phase, so conclusions  about
any  deviations  from  the original  statement  of good intentions  must be tentative.
EQIP consolidates  several incentive programs included in previous farm legislation
into  a single  effort to encourage farmers  to protect environmental  quality through
their choice of  farm practices.  The overall goal is to "maximize environmental benefits
per dollar spent" from the $200 million of  non-discretionary  funds allocated as part of
the 1996 farm bill ($130 million the first year, $200 million each year thereafter through
2002). EQIP is combined with a revamped Conservation Reserve Program in the new
Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program.  Half of the dollars must be
directed toward environmental problems of livestock production.
Voluntary Approach to Maximizing Benefit per Dollar.  Unlike ESA, EQIP
relies  completely on positive monetary  incentives  to lure  landowners  into  actions
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of the environment."
Maximizing the benefits of environmental enhancement spending would seem
to require that the program target the most costly environmental problems and induce
private land use behavior that mitigates  those problems at least cost.  The missing
phrase in this language  is "to whom-so-ever  they accrue,"  the guiding principle of
benefit-cost  analysis  of U.S.  public  works  projects  as  required under  Senate
Document 97 of 1962 (U.S. Senate) and the national income account of  the Principles
and Standards of the Water Resources Council,  signed by President Nixon in 1973.
Maximizing anything implies disregard of who is affected by the result. That principle
has already been compromised with the requirement to spend half of EQIP dollars on
livestock.  Perhaps environmental problems from livestock are indeed the most costly
and damaging environmental impacts of farming.  But, even if that is the case, the
one-half rule makes little sense.  Perhaps all of the $200 million should be spent on
livestock pollution problems to truly maximize benefits.
EQIP also allocates discretion to the states to identify priority problems  and
relative  likelihood  of success  in  treating  them.  Thus,  it  seems  that  the national
optimum  spending pattern  is a composite of state optima.  That is not a surprising
feature, given the extensive state-level structure in place for all USDA programs, but
it does fly in the face of the maximizing principle.  Of course, not all state priority areas
can be  funded, thus some degree of national  priority setting does enter the picture.
EQIP targeting refers to areas  or locations of high priority rather than specific problems
or economic returns to pollution reduction.
Farmers are invited to submit bids-what they could do for the environment at
what price.  Incentives go with defined practices rather than performance  standards
because of the inherent difficulties in sorting out the amount of pollution contributed
by any  given farm.  Farmers  do have special  knowledge  of how their production
systems perform with a unique set of resources,  thus encouraging their bids would
seem to be  a relatively  efficient  approach.  An eligible farmer  must first have an
approved  conservation  plan.  The  State  Conservationist  will  then provide  the
incentives  to those farms deemed to generate the most net environmental  benefit per
dollar.  Individual farm contracts must be for at least five years, but not more than ten.
States also propose "areas of statewide concern,"  problems beyond the individual
farm that affect the overall quality of state resources.  An eligible farmer within those
areas  will get special  consideration  for cost share and  incentive payments.  States
must convene local work groups to provide guidance on highest priority environmental
problems from farming within the state.
Inducing More Environmental Quality.  There is a very interesting allocation
rule involved.  "CCC shall provide incentive payments for a land management practice
that would not otherwise be initiated without government assistance"  (EQIP Rules
1401466.23 (a2)).  Included are integrated pest management, manure management and
irrigation water management.  The intent is to go beyond what would be economically
rational  for the business  and induce private  actions  that have social value.  There
would likely be considerable variation among farmers in the price for performing an
environmental  service.  We must  also assume  that  the  farmer  has  a  right  not to
manage his resources in an environmentally sound manner if  the program is completely
voluntary.
Experience shows that farmers actually invest in soil conservation practices at
levels not explained by economic returns  alone (Batie).  Thus, determining what it
would take to induce  a  farmer to do more  than he would  in the  absence  of those
incentives is problematic.  Farmers are not permitted to "double-dip" by getting EQIP
incentives  for land in the Conservation Reserve.
There  is  an implicit income distribution filter in the program in that "large"
confined livestock operations are not eligible for cost sharing.  Large means greater
than 1,000 animal units. Additionally, no farmer may receive more than S50,000 in a
year.
Efficiency  vs Distribution. Implementation of EQIP reveals the inherent tension
between efficiency and distributional goals.  The notion of system-wide  efficiency
built into  EQIP  law  is  sound, but inoperable.  There  is no real  constituency  for
national efficiency, except perhaps within the community of professional economists
who, incidentally,  fight diligently to protect the market distorting principle  of job
tenure.  Implementation in a democracy confronts the "reality of who," that is-who
must give  up  something to  help  someone  else  and  who  gains  at  someone  else's
expense.  The fact that such shifts may enhance national efficiency of environmental
investment is  scant comfort  to those asked to sacrifice for the principle.  The more
telling questions are where do the gainers and losers live, and what is their ethnic or
income  category?  These characteristics  will affect  real performance  of any  law,
including EQIP, since success of any policy requires a generally positive balance of
support which,  in turn,  depends on distribution of impact.  A conceptually  "good"
policy that offends nearly everyone will not long survive for long.  That certainly
was the experience with water project development under the Principles and Standards
noted above.  The Principles were modified from a strict national efficiency criterion
to a multi-purpose framework that includes regional, environmental and social well-
being  consequences  of the planned  project.  Then, people  could  argue  over the
magnitudes of impact calculated for each category.
EQIP  may  be  a case  where  implementation  improves  on  good  intentions.
Efficiency is largely an economist's pipe dream and not a practical decision rule for
policy. Despite current rhetoric about privatization and market-like devices for public
programs, there is no reason to assume that competition for EQIP dollars will produce
a result that is inherently "better" than many other decision rules for fund allocation.
141National efficiency, maximum environmental benefit per dollar, is already sacrificed
when the implementing  delivery system  favors state-level  decisions  and livestock
operations smaller than  1,000  animal units.  Ohio received $3 million of the $130
million allocated this year. Presumably, states where livestock predominates received
an  even  larger portion  of the  total.  Within Ohio,  funds will be distributed  fairly
evenly among two state priority areas and all farms outside of those areas (Rausch
and  Sohngen).  The result  is  certainly  not random, but neither  is it the  economic
optimum for Ohio.  It is probably the best option under the circumstances  and can be
defended  in Washington.
With no explicit medium of exchange to accomplish efficient allocation through
open competition, the information cost of determining the net environmental benefit
of alternative  farm level projects could be enormous.  In reality, the allocation will be
done as it always has in natural resource programs of USDA, some for nearly every
place within the state and county distribution structure.  If cloaking it all in a veneer
of competition and national efficiency helps keep OMB and other forces for privatizing
resource policy at bay. so much the better.
Florida's Property Rights  Protection Act
Property  rights protection  statutes  have been  enacted in about twenty states
since  1992.  Most of these are of the "look before you leap" variety, requiring state
agencies  to anticipate  the likely  effects  of proposed  rules  on the rights of private
land  owners.  They are patterned  after  language  contained  in President  Reagan's
Executive Order 12630 of 1988, requiring federal agencies to consider whether proposed
rules might constitute a "taking" under prevailing legal standards.  As such, property
rights laws  do not constitute  substantive  limits on the  authority of state  and local
governments  to enact regulations to protect the health, safety and general welfare of
the public.  Like the environmental  impact statements  required under the National
Environmental  Protection Act (NEPA),  these  statutes  only  require  that  agencies
document and weigh these  impacts before moving ahead (Cordes).
Statutory Limits on Loss of Property Value.  Florida and Texas have enacted
laws that require compensation when a defined level of impact on the market value of
private  property has been attributed to a particular change in law or implementing
rules.  The threshold in Texas is 25 percent reduction in property value; the Florida
rule applies when a policy or procedure "inordinately burdens" a private landowner.
Both  laws establish what lawyers  call a "bright line" for defining a legal taking of
private  property through the regulatory process.  They  attempt to cut through the
conflicting signals of case law dealing with Constitutional takings to establish a clear
signal that too much private value has been taken by rule changes that limit options
of the land owner to protect the public interest.  Further, they establish a threshold
much  lower  than  the prevailing  Constitutional  test  that essentially  all economic
value  must  be regulated  away  before  property  is  lost  to  the  owner, requiring
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intent of regulations, acknowledging that important public purpose  is served unless
full economic value is lost (Cordes).
The  Florida  law  deliberately goes  beyond  Constitutional taking.  "It  is  the
intent of the Legislature that, as a separate and distinct cause of action from the law
of takings, the Legislature  herein provides for relief, or payment of compensation,
when a new law, rule, regulation or ordinance of the state or political entity within the
state, as applied,  unfairly affects  real property.  The owner of that real property is
entitled to  relief, which may  include  compensation  for the actual  loss to  the fair
market value  of the  real property,  caused by  the  action of government"  (Florida
Statutes,  Section  70.001(2)).  A  "government  entity" under  this  statute  does  not
include a federal  agency and the  section "does not apply to any actions taken by a
government  entity which  relate  to  the  operation,  maintenance  or expansion  of
transportation  facilities."  An "existing  use"  is  defined  in the  law  to  include  a
reasonably  foreseeable  future  use, thus  giving  owners rights  in potential  future
value (Powell 1995, p. 266-68).  The law became effective on October 1, 1995, and
applies only to laws enacted after May 11,  1995,  the last day of the  1995 legislative
session.  It does not attempt to redress past impacts on property values, but looks at
future  actions  only.  Additionally,  future  implementing  actions  based on  statutes
passed before May  11,  1995,  are not covered under this law.
Procedures.  The  damaged  property  owner  must file  a  claim  against  the
responsible agency or agencies and include an appraisal showing loss of value.  The
agency has six months to respond with a settlement offer that could be a land swap,
modification of the project or rules to mitigate the impact, an agreement to purchase
the affected  property, or  denial that inordinate  burden has occurred.  If the owner
rejects the government offer, he or she may file a claim for compensation in the circuit
court.  The court then decides if an inordinate burden has, in fact, been imposed and,
if so, which agency is responsible for what  share of that burden.  The agency  can
appeal the court's decision and, if successful,  the landowner must bear the cost of
the appeal process. If the claim survives, a jury is impaneled to determine the amount
of compensation due on the basis of property values  only, not any loss of business
that may not be reflected in property value.  If the agency wins in court and the court
determines that the landowner turned down a reasonable settlement offer, the owner
pays court costs.  If the agency is forced to compensate the owner, the agency then
owns the rights or interests it acquired and may transfer those rights for development
elsewhere under a transfer of development rights program.
The Florida law goes further than any other state property rights law to grant
statutory  protection  for property  rights.  But,  the  law  was really  a  compromise
fashioned by the governor to divert more stringent proposals.  The proposal achieved
a remarkable balance among interests while sustaining the basic purpose of enhancing
rights of property owners.  It passed by a unanimous vote in the Florida House and
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constitution, endorsed by enough voters to go on the general ballot in 1994, would
have required compensation  for any regulatory reduction  in private property value.
The State Supreme Court struck this and two similar amendment proposals from the
ballot as being too vague  in language and presentation for the voters (Powell 1995,
p. 261-64).
What are the Results?  The Bert J. Harris, Jr. Property Rights Protection Act in
Florida is a relatively new law, too new for definitive conclusions about performance.
Like any law, however, it is a bundle of incentives designed to alter system functioning
in  a particular way.  In  this case, the law responds to claims  by private landowners
that state, local and regional laws designed to protect natural resources or guide the
path of growth are forcing owners to bear an unfair portion of the cost of achieving
those  public  goals.  Clear  intent of the  law  is  to shift more of the  cost  onto the
implementing agency and, thereby,  onto the general taxpayer.  It does so by giving
property owners the right to demand settlement from the agency without the burden
of raising the issue to the level of a Constitutional taking.
Results  of the  law  will inevitably  depart  somewhat  from  stated  intentions.
Observations  about  unintended  consequences  of the  complex  mix  of incentives
contained in the law may be grouped  into two major categories-boundary  issues
and distributional effects.
Boundary Issues.  Rules determining which actions are subject to the law and
which are not,  as well  as who has the rights and who does not, provide  important
indications of overall performance.
Timing-the magic of May  11,  1995.  An essential compromise along the
road to unanimity was the cut-off date.  If the landowner's right to settlement
was  made  retroactive,  the  system  would be immediately  out of control.
Thus,  laws,  rules,  regulations  or ordinances  passed before  that date  are
exempt from the provisions of the law. An amendment to an old law, as in
the amendment of a local zoning ordinance, for example, is covered only to
the extent that the amendment itself imposes inordinate burden.  Based on
this eligibility rule, several of the nine demands for settlement filed thus far
were rejected by the governmental units. The City of Miami Beach rejected
a claim brought under its historic preservation district enacted in 1996, but
as part of a general zoning ordinance  enacted several years earlier (Boulris,
p. 41).  In another case, the owner claimed that the 1996 decision by the City
of Clearwater  to deny continuation of a variance to the zoning ordinance
constituted an inordinate burden on his property value.  The City continues
to argue that since the zoning ordinance is not covered under the property
rights law, the claim is invalid (Powell, 1997).  An unintended incentive of
this eligibility provision is that local governments will be reluctant to change
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future enforcement actions back to earlier rules rather than enact new ones.
*  Only those landowners in the path of development will experience reductions
in property value  from  growth management  rules.  If there is  no zoning
ordinance  now,  there  probably  will not  be  in the  future  because  of the
property rights statute.  If there is zoning, but poorly implemented, it is still
exempt from the  law.  Perhaps the property rights protection  statute will
encourage more vigorous enforcement  of old ordinances.
*  Transportation actions do not count.  No public action has greater effect on
the pattern of growth and value of private property than those "related to
the operation, maintenance or expansion of transportation facilities."  But,
since these  tend to be value  enhancing rather  than reducing,  landowners
do not complain.  Public transportation  investments may create  value  on
private land that owners can then sue to protect.  Growth management will
be very difficult under these conditions and many citizens will feel damaged
by the pressures that road extensions or improvements create.  Thus, owners
and residents will be penalized to protect the increment in land value that
their taxes helped to create.
*  Non-owners  need not apply.  Provisions of the property rights law apply
only to private holders of  title.  Lessees, contractors  and units of government
may not bring action. Yet, absentee landlords, whether of farmland or inner
city neighborhoods, may not represent the interests of those most affected
by the change of rules that becomes the cause for action under the law.
*  The  Feds  are  golden.  Actions  of a  federal  agency  are  not covered,  yet
these  may  have  the  greatest  impact  on  private  property  value.
Implementating  rules  for the  U.S.  Endangered  Species  Act  are  a  case in
point.  The  notion of shifting the cost  of achieving  public purpose  from
private owners to a public agency may be thwarted when federal rules are
involved.
*  Promptness pays.  An owner must bring action within one year of the time
the new law is applied to the property in question to have a "ripe" claim.  It
makes  sense  to  move  things  along  and  avoid  delays  that  could  further
burden the landowner.  But, this provision could encourage frivolous suits
just to assure access,  and might foreclose legitimate claims for losses that
take longer to become apparent.
Distribution.  The Florida Property Rights Protection Act sets  in motion an
extensive and costly negotiation process.  There is no sharp threshold of eligibility
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line" approach-a reduction of 24 percent of land value would not be actionable and
26 percent would be always actionable.  Given all of the problems with measuring
land values, so sharp a test of eligibility makes little sense.  But, defining "inordinate
burden" is  hardly an exact  science,  either.  Gathering evidence will be expensive.
Considerable  case  law  will  be needed  to  establish  consistent  standards  for the
inordinate burden.  Since the public agency is immediately on the defensive, and the
owner has the best information  about his own property, the transaction  cost burden
would seem to rest with the public.  The opposite is true under Constitutional takings
cases where the property owner is taking on the legal system.  This redistribution of
the  cost of achieving  public purpose  is  exactly  what  proponents  of the  new law
intended.  Some  private  owners  will be  better  able  to  manage  the  expense  than
others, presumably  an unintended result (although the record  shows that Florida's
largest corporate  landowners were the most active supporters of the property rights
bill).
*  Full  employment  for appraisers  and economists.  The  initial  claim  for
settlement must  include an appraisal  showing that reasonable investment-
backed expectations have been undercut by the law in question.  The agency
will counter with its own appraisal.  The obvious winners in all of this are
the "experts"  in economic  value.  Of course, Constitutional  taking cases
require costly information as well, but there  are fewer such cases.
*  Agency priorities.  There are no new dollars appropriated to help agencies
respond to demands for settlement.  No new people will be hired to conduct
negotiations.  Few public agencies have growing budgets these days; people
must be  reassigned  to  get  the job  done.  That  means that  the  ongoing
business of the agencies  to implement the public interest in use of natural
resources  must be put aside to deal with compensation claims.  Taxpayers
pay  for agency responses  to landowner  claims and pay in terms of other
environmental  benefits  foregone  by this  shift in priorities.  Thus,  some
citizens  gain while others  lose.  Most of the owner actions thus far have
been brought by large firms, so it is likely that the relatively wealthy improve
themselves  at the expense of the less wealthy.
*  Deep pockets are useful.  While the law is meant to apply to all owners who
feel aggrieved by public regulations,  only those with sufficient resources
to fight through all the steps will venture into battle.  A well-prepared case
with a detailed appraisal is a necessary first step.  If the owner fails to accept
a reasonable settlement offer after the initial 180-day period, he or she could
end up paying for the whole process.  Only the wealthy can take that kind
of chance.
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behind  closed  doors.  There  are  no hearings;  no  chance  for the broader
public to register concerns about the public good being bargained away by
the  agency.  The public  may want  the agency  to hold the line to protect
natural features or historical buildings and would be willing to pay to protect
those qualities, but they never really have the opportunity  to say so.  An
aggressive, well-prepared owner may bluff a timid bureaucrat with public
funds behind him into early settlement.  Owners lucky enough to live in a
community  with  a  compliant,  risk-averse  public  official  may benefit
substantially, while a neighbor may lose big with the same type of case.
*  Beggar thy neighbor.  There is concern that communities will be tempted to
compete  with  each other  to  create  the  most  permissive  development
environment (Vargus, p. 395-96).  This was certainly not intended in the law,
but incentives for that result are clearly there.
Conclusions  and Recommendations  for  Policy  Educators
Several overall conclusions about policy implementation emerge from the three
cases reviewed.
Expectations-what might really happen. Changes in policy and the rules that
put  them to  work alter long-term  expectations  of people  dealing  in the resource
market.  That, after all, is the purpose of policy change.  People respond not only to
the  immediate  change  options, but  also  to what they  think might happen  in the
future.  Possible futures influence current actions.  Landowners simply do not believe
that ESA habitat modification rules are stable.  They know that staff of the Fish and
Wildlife  Service  are learning  as they go and  are basically unable  to keep  up with
demands.  Staff are trying  to be responsive  to landowner  needs, but  owners  are
nervous  about what new rules  may come  along.  Endangered  species  are  hardly
better off in that environment.
Observers of the Florida Property  Rights Protection Act have  stated that its
real purpose is to make governmental agencies think twice about imposing new rules
to protect a natural resource amenity at the expense of the private landowner.  They
do not expect a rash of claims, just enough to plant the seed of caution in the minds
of the  elected  or appointed official.  Environmental  groups  refer to the  "chilling
effect"  of the possibility of expensive  administrative  and legal proceedings on the
willingness of agencies  to carry out their mandates.  There have been several  such
instances reported in Florida already.  Others may see this as appropriately shifting
the burden of responsibility and, thus, generally restoring confidence in government
(Powell 1995, p. 296).
147Efficiency/distribution.  As noted, there is always a political trade-off between
efficiency and distribution in policy implementation, if not in the law itself.  There is
always  pressure  to  spread the  goodies  around,  to  maintain a  positive balance  of
support for the program and for the implementing  agency. National and state efficiency
are laudable symbols that are intellectually attractive, but fade quickly with the "reality
of who."  Few attend rallies for efficiency, except as a proxy for reducing their share
of the  cost.
Appeal of Voluntarism.  Voluntary incentive-based  environmental programs
are definitely fashionable and can improve efficiency within a given firmn  by providing
an incentive to achieve  a defined goal at least cost.  But, system-wide performance
requires  setting standards and other boundaries  on the behavior of individual firms
or governmental  entities  to  assure  consistency.  Policy  efficiency  is  simply  not
compatible with a highly decentralized decision system, with no consistent medium
of exchange.  Incentives would have to be very finely tuned to guide private actions
in a collectively rational direction.  EQIP implementation requires a tremendous amount
of information to build incentives that guide private actions toward public purpose.
There are overlapping  levels of discretion-national priorities,  state priority areas
and individual farm bids for incentive dollars.  There is an impressive, almost painful,
effort to avoid any mention of  mandatory action in EQIP. The program will accomplish
some useful things, but "maximizing environmental benefit per dollar" is a dream.
Policy education.  Useful  education about resource policy must do far more
than describe  the provisions  of a new law.  In line with alternatives/consequences
traditions,  the educator must trace through both explicit and implied incentives  of
the law  and implementing  rules  to judge  net effects  and their distribution.  These
observations can also be very helpful in revisions to the rules; educators can participate
in these revisions with  a clear conscience.
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